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HEN entering into any venture, a taxpayer faces a number of
issues that he must resolve so that risks can be properly con-
trolled and minimized and potential profits can be maximized.
In particular, natural resource ventures entail high risks and heavy invest-
ments that often make it necessary for several taxpayers to join in a single
venture.' Each member contributes skills or capital in return for an
agreed-upon share of the risk and profit. Some type of business arrange-
ment is necessary to define the rights and obligations of the members. The
agreement creating the arrangement must set forth the participants' under-
standing of (1) the allocation of risks and profits, (2) the authority for con-
ducting operations, and (3) each participant's ability to withdraw or
transfer its interest. The terms of the agreement will generally also deter-
mine the nature of the organization for federal income tax purposes. 2
The partnership is generally the preferred form of business entity for
natural resource ventures because of the ability to pass through taxable
losses incurred by the partnership to the individual partners. 3 Because the
common law and federal income tax definitions of partnership are not
Editor's Note: Unless otherwise indicated all statutory references are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, which is codified in title 26 of the United States Code.
Internal Revenue Code sections are cited to the 1976 permanent edition and/or current
supplement of the United States Code, if therein. Otherwise, code sections are cited to the
main edition and/or current supplement of the United States Code Annotated published by
West Publishing Company. All Treasury Regulations are cited by section number and may
be found in 26 C.F.R. (1983) unless otherwise indicated.
1. Natural resource investments are an expanding universe of activities involving the
exploration, acquisition, development, and conservation of mineral, oil and gas, water, and
land resources. See Getches, Preface. On Natural Resources as an Area of the Law, 53 U.
COLO. L. REV. 195 (1982). The term "natural resources" as used here includes oil, gas, coal,
and other resources obtained by drilling or mining processes.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Kintner, 216. F.2d 418, 424 (9th Cir. 1954) (general part-
nership under state law treated as association taxable as a corporation); Taxpayer's Actions
Determine Existence of Partnerships, I 1 TAX'N FOR LAW. 246, 246 (1983) (conduct of parties
and amendments to agreement determine characterization of organization). But see Morris-
sey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 360 (1935) (organization formed as trust classified as
association taxable as a corporation); I W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 2.02, at 2-7 (1977) (venturers are limited in
their ability to have enterprise taxed as they desire).
3. See I.R.C. §§ 611-617 (West 1967 & Supp. 1983) (deductions for depletion, explora-
tion, and development of natural resources).
[Vol. 37
NATURAL RESOURCE VENTURES
identical, the partnership agreement should be carefully drafted to achieve
the legal and tax consequences originally anticipated. On occasion, pur-
ported partnerships have been found to be associations taxable as corpora-
tions,4 thereby precluding the members from using the profits or losses
generated by the venture against other income or loss. In contrast to cor-
porations, partnerships provide a degree of flexibility by allowing mem-
bers to allocate income and deductions among themselves. If special
allocations of income and deductions are not needed, co-ownership and
joint operation may be less burdensome forms of doing business, even
though the parties may be treated as members of a partnership for tax
purposes. If special allocations are needed, the agreement between the
parties must create a partnership and the provisions of the agreement will
be important in determining whether a particular allocation will be
respected for tax purposes. 5 This Article discusses selected tax problems of
natural resource ventures relating to (1) the treatment of ventures as co-
ownerships, and (2) the classification of ventures as partnerships or
associations.
I. TAx SIGNIFICANCE OF FORM OF ORGANIZATION
Joint operation of a mineral property may be conducted under any of
the following forms of business organization: co-ownership, joint venture,
partnership, trust, or corporation. A business operated in any of the
noncorporate forms may become an association taxable as a corporation
by engaging in conduct characteristic of a corporation. Each form of busi-
ness organization may carry different tax consequences such as the selec-
tion of the taxable year, elections available to owners or operators of
mineral properties, allocations of income and deductions between the
owners, and certain elections available to owners or operators of mineral
properties. The resolution of these issues is dependent upon whether the
parties have created a separate entity that acts as principal in the develop-
ment and operation of the property. In the absence of a separate entity the
operator of the property is acting merely as agent for the owners.
A. Taxable Year
If the parties create a venture in the form of a corporation or a trust,
such entity is entitled to adopt a taxable year that may or may not corre-
spond to the taxable year of the owners of the venture. 6 A partnership, on
the other hand, may not adopt a taxable year other than that of all its
principal partners, or other than a calendar year if the partners' years dif-
4. See, e.g., Pelton v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 1936) (trust); Foreman
v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134, 137 (S.D. Fla. 1964) (partnership); Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-1(c).
5. See I.R.C. § 704(a) (1976) (partnership agreement determines partner's distributive
share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit); Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.704-1(b), 48 Fed.
Reg. 9871 (Mar. 9, 1983) (allocations must have substantial economic effect).
6. See I.R.C. § 441 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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fer, unless it establishes a business purpose therefor. 7 In 1972, however,
the Internal Revenue Service issued a Revenue Procedure that allows a
partnership to adopt a fiscal year other than that allowed under the preced-
ing general rule where the change or adoption results in a deferral of in-
come to the partners of three months or less.8
For tax purposes, a venture that is considered to be a separate entity
reports its income and deductions on the basis of the fiscal year adopted. 9
In the case of a partnership, each partner includes in his return for a given
taxable year his share of partnership income or loss for the partnership's
year that ends with or within such partner's taxable year.' 0 Where a ven-
ture is not, on the other hand, treated as a separate entity, each co-owner
reports his share of the income or loss from the venture for the period
ending with the owner's taxable year.
B. Elections
In natural resources activities, certain elections are available to a tax-
payer." The term "taxpayer" does not necessarily refer to one who pays
taxes, but may also refer to a reporting entity that is separate and distinct
from its owners. Such entities may elect to expense intangible drilling and
development costs (IDC) incurred on oil and gas wells, or to capitalize and
defer exploration costs for other minerals.' 2 When properly made by the
entity, the elections are binding thereon, and its owners are not, therefore,
entitled to separate elections. 13 By the same token, the entity is not bound
by the elections made by its owners. ' 4
C. Allocation of Income and Deductions Among Owners
In general, most forms of natural resource joint operating arrangements
contemplate or require that each participant share income or expense in
direct proportion to the participant's interest in the underlying property. If
the venture is a partnership, on the other hand, the partners may share
certain items of income or expense, as well as net income or loss, in a
manner that is not necessarily related to their capital contributions,' 5 so
long as the allocation of tax benefits among the partners has substantial
economic effect. The partnership form of doing business thus affords its
owners a great degree of flexibility in tax planning.
7. Id § 706(b)(1) (1976).
8. Rev. Proc. 72-51, 1972-2 C.B. 832.
9. I.R.C. § 441(b) (1976).
10. See id § 702 (West 1982 & Supp. 1983).
11. See, e.g., id § 263(c) (West Supp. 1983) (election to expense intangible drilling and
development costs).
12. IDC may be expensed currently under § 263(c), id., and Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a).
Mining development expenditures may be deducted under I.R.C. § 616 (1976).
13. See Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(d)-(e).
14. See id
15. Concerning special allocations of partnership income, gain, deduction, or loss, see




A. Distinctions Under the 1939 Code
Prior to enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, both the
courts and the Service indicated that co-ownerships would not be treated
as partnerships for federal tax purposes under certain circumstances.' 6
The principal test developed by the courts in differentiating co-ownerships
from partnerships relied on the location of legal title to the venture's prop-
erty.17 The Service, on the other hand, took the position that the principal
test as to the existence of a partnership was the presence of a joint profit
objective.' 8 Each of these approaches deserves further discussion.
L Location of Title to Property
One characteristic of co-ownership that distinguishes it from a partner-
ship is that under co-ownership title to property is ordinarily retained in
the names of the individual participants. In a partnership title is normally
held in the partnership name or that of a nominee on behalf of the partner-
ship. Although the Service has not attached great significance to the ques-
tion of title, the courts, at least for the years in which the 1939 Code was
applicable, considered location of title an important test.19
In Estate of Appleby v. Commissioner20 the Board of Tax Appeals con-
sidered whether a tenancy in common, the form of co-ownership normally
used in natural resource activities, should be treated as a partnership. Al-
though the case did not involve a natural resource property, the Board
16. See, e.g., Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 116-17 (1930); Champlin v. Commissioner,
71 F.2d 23, 28 (10th Cir. 1934).
17. See Marcus v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 824, 832 (1954) (jointly owned property oper-
ated by joint owner does not give rise to partnership); Cohan v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A.
743, 756-57 (1928), afj'd, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930) (jointly owned property does not estab-
lish partnership).
18. See Finch v. Commissioner, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 692, 697 (1955) (Commissioner
urged existence of partnership solely on basis of joint profit objective).
19. In Bentex Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 565 (1953), the Tax Court disre-
garded the situs of title to property. Three co-owners of a lease, pursuant to a Service ruling,
filed a partnership-information return of income, designating the operation as a joint ven-
ture. On the return a deduction was claimed for intangible drilling costs. The taxpayer,
which was one of the co-owners, elected to capitalize intangible drilling costs in its individ-
ual return. In examining the taxpayer's returns the Service at first disallowed the loss of the
co-ownership to the extent that it was attributable to intangible drilling costs that were
treated as a deduction. The disallowance was based on the grounds that the co-owners were
not partners. After protest by the taxpayer, the entire loss was allowed on the basis that the
operation of the lease constituted a partnership. Before the Tax Court, the taxpayer argued
that its previous position was incorrect, that the co-ownership did not constitute a partner-
ship, and that the intangible costs incurred should have been capitalized. The court, without
stating a reason for its conclusion, found that the operation of the lease constituted a joint
venture or partnership. Id at 571. Unless the Tax Court decided the issue on some grounds
of equitable estoppel, or on the grounds that the filing of the partnership-information return
designating the operation as a joint venture was a conclusive indication of the intention of
the parties to form a joint venture, the decision appears questionable. The petition for re-
view by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was dismissed as the result of a compro-
mise settlement on all issues for approximately one-fifth of the proposed deficiency.
20. 41 B.T.A. 18 (1940), aft'd, 123 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1941).
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held that tenancy in common was an estate so old and well known that it
was almost inconceivable that it could be classified as a partnership for
federal tax purposes.21 The Board observed that tenancies in common
were not normally treated as a unit, and stated that the extension of the
definition of partnership to such a form of ownership would raise serious
questions as to the classification of other forms of ownership having simi-
lar attributes, such as marital communities and tenancies by the entirety. 22
Co-owners of improved realty who appoint a common agent to maintain
and manage the property are also not partners for federal tax purposes. In
Gilford v. Commissioner 23 the court held that co-owners doing business
through an agent were not partners in the absence of any intention to be-
come partners. 24 The appointment of a common agent did not manifest an
intent to create such a partnership.
The importance of the title test is also indicated by court decisions re-
garding the right to income and deductions between principal and agent.
In Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Commissioner 25 the Tax Court held that when
an agent operates a property for the owner, the owner is taxable on all
income and entitled to claim all deductions relating to the property.26 The
court stated that the same result would be reached where the operator was
also owner of an interest in the property.27 Each owner is required to re-
port his proportionate share of the gross income and deductions from the
property.
2 Joint Profit Objective
The joint profit objective test originated in Income Tax Ruling 3930. 28
In that ruling the Service took the position under the 1939 Code that in
determining whether an organization was a co-ownership or a partnership
the most important factor was the presence of a joint profit objective.29 If
a joint profit objective was present, the Service held that the organization
was either a partnership or an association taxable as a corporation, de-
pending upon which of the two forms the organization more nearly resem-
bled.30 The Service further held in Income Tax Ruling 3930 that when the
parties to an oil and gas operating agreement associate themselves only in
the operation of the property and not in the sale of the product derived
from the property, they did not have a joint profit objective. 31 In other
words, if the parties to the agreement reserved the right to take production
21. 41 B.T.A. at 20; see also 6 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§ 35.03 (rev. ed. 1983) (outlining various tests for determining existence of partnership).
22. 41 B.T.A. at 20-21.
23. 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 175 (1952), af'd, 201 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1953).
24. 11 T.C.M. (CCH) at 177.
25. 10 T.C. 908 (1948).
26. Id at 914.
27. Id.
28. I.T. 3930, 1948-2 C.B. 126, as modfiedby I.T. 3933, 1948-2 C.B. 130.





from the property in kind and dispose of it themselves, or if they delegated
the right of disposal for a limited period of time and the right was termina-
ble at will, they had reserved to themselves individually the income pro-
ducing features of the operation and therefore lacked a joint profit
objective.
The Service had not always followed the position espoused in Income
Tax Ruling 3930. In Income Tax Ruling 2749 co-owners of a jointly oper-
ated oil and gas lease were held to be partners.32 The ruling disregarded
both the question of title to property and the joint profit objective in find-
ing the existence of a partnership. The Service stated that the relationship
fell within the broad scope of the term "joint venture," without reference
to any test to be applied in individual circumstances. 33 Since such an asso-
ciation of individuals constituted a partnership, the organization was re-
quired to file a partnership return and was entitled to make elections as to
taxable year and expensing of IDC.34 Shortly thereafter, the Service ruled
that the filing requirement of Income Tax Ruling 2749 would be fulfilled
where the operator of the co-owned property prepared and filed a modified
partnership return showing only the owners' respective shares of revenues
and expenditures.35 The views expressed in these rulings remained in ef-
fect until the Service issued Income Tax Ruling 3930 in 1948.
More recently, the Tax Court refused to follow the conclusion drawn in
Income Tax Ruling 3930 that a take-in-kind provision forecloses partner-
ship status. In Madison Gas & Electric Co. v. Commissioner36 the court
found that a valid partnership may exist for federal income tax purposes
even though a joint venture agreement contains a take-in-kind provision,
which eliminates the joint profit objective.37 The holding of Income Tax
Ruling 3930 may therefore be moot since it appears that this judicial inter-
pretation of the term "partnership" provides an adequate basis for classify-
ing ventures as partnerships. The holding may, however, still have validity
in determining whether a venture is a co-ownership or an association taxa-
ble as a corporation.
B. Rules Under the 1954 Code
The 1954 Code recognizes the joint profit objective test 38 and the regula-
tions give recognition to the title test,39 although such provisions are not
expressly incorporated to distinguish between co-ownerships and partner-
ships. Section 761(a) does not expressly state, but may imply, that all joint
32. I.T. 2749, 13-1 C.B. 99 (1934). This ruling was later modified by I.T. 3930, 1948-2
C.B. 126.
33. I.T. 2749, 13-1 C.B. 99 (1934).
34. Id.
35. I.T. 2785, 13-1 C.B. 96 (1934). This ruling was also modified by I.T. 3930, 1948-2
C.B. 126.
36. 72 T.C. 521 (1979), aft'd, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980).
37. 72 T.C. at 557-63.
38. I.R.C. § 761(a) (Supp. V 1981).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a).
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operations of natural resource properties that do not constitute corpora-
tions, associations taxable as corporations, trusts, or estates are partner-
ships for federal income tax purposes.4° The statute also grants, however,
under certain circumstances, an option to members of unincorporated or-
ganizations to exclude such organization from the application of all or part
of the partnership rules contained in subchapter K of the Code.41 The
election must be made by all of the members of the organization and is
available only if the organization is availed of:
(1) for investment purposes only and not for the active conduct of
a business, [or]
(2) for the joint production, extraction, or use of property, but not
for the purpose of selling services or property produced or extracted
[In such cases, the election is available only] if the income of the
members of the organization may be adequately determined without
the computation of partnership taxable income.42
In addition to the requirements of the statute, the regulations require
that the participants "[o]wn the property as coowners, either in fee or
under lease or other form of contract granting exclusive operating rights"
in order to qualify for the election.43 The regulations apparently take the
position that co-ownerships that actively carry on a trade, business,
financial operation, or venture and divide the profits thereof are consid-
ered for federal income tax purposes to be partnerships, and that an elec-
tion to be excluded from application of the partnership rules must be made
to obtain treatment as a co-ownership. 44
A co-ownership that does not make the necessary election, a joint ven-
ture, a limited partnership, and a general partnership come within the
Code provisions relating to partnerships, and each form of organization is
considered a separate entity acting as principal for its own account.45 In
such cases the entity is entitled to adopt a taxable year and make appropri-
40. The statutory definition of partnership contained in I.R.C. § 761(a) (Supp. V 1981)
is identical with the definition in § 3797 of the 1939 Code. Under the prior Code, co-owner-
ships were not considered partnerships by reason of the general terms of the Code. Con-
gress, by granting an election to certain types of organizations to be excluded from
application of the partnership provisions, probably did not intend organizations that were
not partnerships under prior law to now be treated as partnerships in the absence of an
election.
41. I.R.C. § 761(a) (Supp. V 1981).
42. Id § 761(a). Id § 761(a)(3) provides that an unincorporated organization availed
of "by dealers in securities for a short period for the purpose of underwriting, selling, or
distributing a particular issue of securities" is also eligible to elect out of the provisions of
subchapter K of the Code.
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a)(3)(i).
44. Mere co-ownership of property that is maintained, kept in repair, and rented or
leased does not constitute a partnership in the absence of such an intent by the co-owners,
nor does the filing of a partnership return substantially establish partnership existence. Id
§ 1.761-1(a); Powell v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 161, 164-65 (1967).
45. Theoretically, a true partnership might meet the qualifying requirements of I.R.C.
§ 761 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) and the regulations thereunder, and be entitled to the election,
but such circumstances would probably be rare.
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ate elections.46 In the case of a co-ownership that makes an appropriate
election not to become subject to the partnership provisions, a separate
entity is not created, and the operator acts on behalf of the other co-own-
ers.4 7 In this instance, each co-owner reports as taxable income his share of
all items of taxable income received or accrued by the operator and reports
as allowable deductions his share of all deductions paid or incurred by the
operator. The income and deductions are reported at the time received,
accrued, paid, or incurred by the operator without regard to the operator's
fiscal period, and each co-owner makes separate elections regarding IDC
and similar items.48
In Revenue Ruling 65-118 the Service ruled that a joint venture that
elects not to be treated as a partnership for purposes of subchapter K is
nevertheless a partnership for purposes of determining the limitation on
the amount of used section 38 property that qualified for the investment
tax credit.49 The Service therefore takes the position that a co-ownership
arrangement is still considered a partnership for purposes of those sections
of the Code outside subchapter K.50 The Tax Court sustained the position
of the Service in Bryant v. Commissioner.51 On the basis of the above rea-
soning, IDC incurred by ventures electing out of subchapter K should be
considered as incurred at the entity level, rather than by the co-owners,
since the option to deduct such costs is granted under section 263(c), which
is not a part of subchapter K.5 2 The Service, however, apparently uses the
foregoing reasoning only to impose limitations that would apply at the
partnership level on credits and deductions if no election to be excluded
from subchapter K had been made.
1. Election to be Treated as Co-Ownership
Joint ventures and genuine partnerships, whether general or limited,
46. Id. § 706 (Supp. V 1981) (governing adoption of taxable year for organization that
qualifies as partnership); see Kritzik v. Gallman, 344 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109, 41 A.D.2d 994, 996
(1973). Other elections made by the entity include whether to treat cutting of timber as a
sale or exchange, Beilke v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 13, 13 (1963), and whether to
expense land-clearing costs, Rev. Rul. 66-141, 1966-1 C.B. 56.
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(b) indicates that an organization electing out of the provisions
of subchapter K is no longer a separate entity, but is an organization composed of members
who must report their respective shares of income, deduction, and credit items, making such
elections as to individual items as may be appropriate.
48. Id. The election to expense IDC is particularly important both in and out of the
partnership context, since once made the election is permanent. See Boone v. United States,
374 F. Supp. 115, 121 (D.N.D. 1974). Note, however, that partnership elections do not bind
the partners with respect to matters they are entitled to elect as individuals and vice versa.
I.R.C. § 703(b) (Supp. V 1981). Thus, one important consideration in determining whether
to form a partnership is the treatment to be given IDC. If the individual "elected" to capi-
talize IDC, formation of a partnership that will elect to expense IDC may be advantageous.
49. Rev. Rul. 65-118, 1965-1 C.B. 30, 31; see also Sexton & Charyk, The Partnership
Corner, 7 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 382 (1980) (rules regarding allocation of partnership invest-
ment credit).
50. Rev. Rul. 65-118, 1965-1 C.B. 30, 31.
51. 46 T.C. 848 (1966), affid, 399 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1968).
52. I.R.C. § 263(c) (West Supp. 1983), which allows either capitalization or current de-
duction of IDC, is in subchapter B of the Code.
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rarely have a right to elect out of subchapter K under section 761. 53
Where the election is available, as in the case of joint operating agreements
between co-owners, the issue is whether the venturers desire to be treated
as a partnership or to elect not to be subject to all or part of the partnership
provisions. As a general rule, treatment as either a co-ownership or a part-
nership will not carry adverse tax consequences if the participants in the
joint operation are aware of the classification of the enterprise and plan
their operations accordingly. Most joint operations will elect not to be-
come subject to the partnership provisions because less coordinated tax
planning is required in a co-ownership than in a partnership, but the
choice in each instance will be influenced by many factors.
An election of partial exclusion is hazardous due to the uncertainty that
is introduced into the tax planning of the participants. Under the regula-
tions, an election to be excluded from the application of all of the partner-
ship provisions of the Code is automatically effective, whereas the
Commissioner reserves the power to deny, limit, or expand an election of
partial exclusion.5 4 The request for partial exclusion must be filed within
ninety days after the beginning of the first taxable year for which partial
exclusion is desired.5 5 If the participants consummate a transaction during
the period required for filing and approval of the request, an adverse rul-
ing on the request may upset their tax planning.
2 Qualifying Requirements-Natural Resources
The election to be excluded from application of subchapter K is avail-
able to most unincorporated joint operations of natural resource proper-
ties, regardless of when the venture was formed, provided that (1) the
participants retain ownership of the property as co-owners, in fee or under
a lease or contract granting exclusive operating rights;56 and (2) each par-
ticipant reserves the right to take his share of production in kind, although
an individual participant may delegate to another the authority to sell his
share of production for a period of time not to exceed the minimum needs
of the industry, and in no event for more than one year;57 and (3) the
organization does not have as one of its principal purposes "cycling, man-
ufacturing, or processing" operations for others.58
Most ventures operating under standard joint operating agreements ful-
fill the first two of these requirements. Those joint operations that do not,
therefore, involve cycling, natural gasoline plant operation, or processing
53. Id § 761(a) (Supp. V 1981); see Campbell & Crump, Drilling Venture Does Not
Meet Criteria to Qualifyfor Exclusion from Subchapter K, 31 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 472 (1982).
54. See Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(c).
55. Id
56. Id. § 1.761-2(a)(3)(i).
57. Id §§ 1.761-2(a)(3)(ii)-(iii). In T.A.M. 8226014 (Mar. 10, 1982) the Service ruled
that the right to purchase oil and gas products under an exclusive right of first refusal consti-
tuted a contract to purchase when the right was, in essence, of unlimited duration. The right
was held, therefore, to invalidate the election to be excluded from the partnership
provisions.
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a)(3).
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for nonmembers other than owners of related royalty interests, should
clearly be eligible for the election. In such cases the venture is not re-
quired to file a partnership return in order to protect its ability to expense
IDC or costs of mine exploration.
If the operation of a cycling plant or other manufacturing or processing
facility for others is an integral part of the joint operations, then the ques-
tion arises whether the performance of such activities constitutes one of the
principal purposes of the organization, thus depriving such organization of
the right to elect exclusion. 59 This question is one of fact that must be
decided on the basis of the circumstances in each case. Where the joint
owners of producing oil and gas properties also own a cycling or gasoline
plant that services nonmembers and wish to avoid partnership status, pru-
dence dictates that a partnership return be filed and the election exercised.
In this manner the election out of subchapter K will be protected if the
joint operation is later classified as not having processing for others as one
of its principal purposes. The return should also contain language con-
cerning the election to expense IDC or the election to capitalize mine ex-
ploration expenditures in case the election out of subchapter K is held to
be ineffective.
3. Manner of Making Election
Under current regulations, the election by a qualified joint operation not
to be subject to subchapter K generally must be made in a statement at-
tached to, or incorporated in, a properly executed partnership return.60 An
election to secure exclusion from subchapter K will be recognized, how-
ever, even though no formal election is filed if the facts and circumstances
indicate that the members of the organization intended at the time of its
formation to secure exclusion from subchapter K.6 1 Such an intention
may be indicated if, at the time of formation, an agreement exists among
the members that the organization be excluded from subchapter K, or if
the members of the organization report their respective shares of items of
income, deduction, and credit from the joint operation on their returns in a
manner consistent with an exclusion from subchapter K.62 Under the regu-
lations the election need not be incorporated in the operating agreement. 63
Nevertheless, operating agreements should contain (1) an express election
not to be subject to subchapter K, and (2) an express direction to the oper-
ator to take all necessary steps under the statute and regulations to elect to
avoid the application of the partnership rules to the joint operation.
A co-ownership is not required to elect exclusion under section 761 for
the first year of its existence, but instead is permitted to make the election
59. Id
60. Id. § 1.761-2(b)(2)(i).
61. Id § 1.761-2(b)(2)(ii).
62. Id
63. Id.; see also 6 J. MERTENS, supra note 21, § 35.03 (describing election to be excluded
from provisions of subchapter K).
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in any taxable year for which exclusion from subchapter K is desired.64 If
the co-owners desire to be excluded under section 761 from inception of
the joint venture, they must file the election or meet the requirements for a
deemed election under the "all facts and circumstances" test for the first
year in which a partnership return is required. 65 The regulations provide
that an unincorporated organization that engages in any business, financial
operation, or venture is a partnership and must, therefore, file a partner-
ship return.66 For purposes of filing a partnership return, however, an
unincorporated organization will not be considered to carry on a business,
financial operation, or venture as a partnership before the first taxable year
in which the organization receives income or incurs any deductible ex-
penditures. 67 In this regard, the Service held in a published ruling that
expenditures by co-owners relating to exploratory work or payment of
rentals prior to any joint activity for production, extraction, or use of the
property are classified as made for the acquisition or retention of property
and are not considered expenditures requiring the filing of a return.68 In
contrast, expenditures made for purposes of exploration and use, such as
expenditures made for the location of individual wells, are expenditures
requiring the filing of a return. If the election to be excluded from the
provisions of subchapter K is not made for the first taxable year, a com-
plete partnership return is required.69 The return should contain the ap-
propriate partnership elections, such as the IDC election, for partnership
activities during the period covered by the return. 70
In order to elect not to be covered by the provisions of subchapter K, a
newly formed organization should file a first year partnership return that
contains, in lieu of the usual information required thereon, (1) the name
and address of the organization, (2) the names and addresses of the partici-
pants, (3) a statement that the organization qualifies for the election and
that all members elect to have it excluded from all of the partnership pro-
visions of the Code, and (4) a statement as to where a copy of the operating
agreement, if written, is located. If the agreement is oral the return should
indicate the person or persons who can supply the provisions of the agree-
ment.71 Since joint operations of oil and gas properties are not normally
given a separate name, the most useful nomenclature would be the name
or description of the property, if any, used by state regulatory authorities.
In the absence of such designation, the customary lease description should
suffice. The address shown on the return should be the address of the prin-
cipal office of the operator and the return should be filed in the office of the
Service Center in the district in which the principal office of the operator is
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(b)(1).
65. Id § 1.761-2(b)(2)(ii).
66. Id §§ 1.6031-1(a), 1.701-1.
67. Id § 1.6031-1(a).
68. Rev. Rul. 56-500, 1956-2 C.B. 464, 466.
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.6031-1(a).
70. See id. § 1.703-1(b).
71. Id § 1.761-2(b)(2)(i).
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located. If the return is filed by a co-owner other than the operator, the
return should be filed with the Service Center in the district where the
person filing the return has his principal office or place of business. In this
case the address of the person filing the return should be indicated instead
of the address of the operator. 72
If the election is made in a year after the organization has filed partner-
ship returns, problems arise as to potential recapture of IDC, depreciation,
investment tax credit, and similar items.73 Whether the organization is re-
quired to recapture such items depends on the manner in which the organ-
ization makes the transition from partnership to another form of business
entity. The focus is on whether the partnership liquidates followed by a
reconstitution of the partnership subject to the election or the partnership
remains intact with the subchapter K provisions removed. In either event,
IDC and depreciation are not recaptured since the deemed liquidating dis-
tribution is pro rata. In Bryant v. Commissioner74 the Tax Court stated
that although the election prevented the application of subchapter K, the
partnership remains intact so that other provisions of the Code apply as if
no election existed. Therefore, investment credit recapture75 should not be
required because for the purpose of section 47, which lies outside of sub-
chapter K, the partnership and each participant's interest therein are still
intact.
4. Right of Co-Owners to Invalidate or Change Election
The election to be excluded from the provisions of subchapter K will be
automatically effective unless one of the co-owners, within ninety days af-
ter formation of the organization, notifies the Commissioner that he
desires subchapter K to apply "and also advises the Commissioner that he
has so notified all other members of the organization by registered or certi-
fied mail."' 76 Timely notification prevents the other co-owners from mak-
ing the election because the statute requires that the election be made by
all co-owners. 77 Hence, failure to take timely affirmative action to dissent
to an election out of subchapter K prevents a co-owner from later ob-
jecting to such an election.78 Once made, the election to be excluded from
the provisions of subchapter K is irrevocable so long as the joint operation
remains qualified, unless approval of revocation is secured from the Com-
missioner.79 Application for permission to revoke the election must be
submitted to the Commissioner not later than thirty days after the begin-
72. Id (address of person filing return should be used; no mention is made of operator).
73. See, e.g., Patton, The Investment Credit and its Recapture in Partnership Transac-
tions, 5 REV. TAX'N INDIVIDUALS 53 (1981).
74. 46 T.C. 848 (1966), aff'd, 399 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1968).
75. I.R.C. § 47 (West 1967 & Pam. Supp. 1983).
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(b)(3).
77. I.R.C. § 761(a) (Supp. V 1981).
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(b)(3)(i).
79. Id. The members of the organization are always free to enter into a separate agree-
ment whereby the business or venture is conducted as a partnership for tax purposes. This
would effectively remove the new organization from "qualifying" for the exclusion, since it
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ning of the taxable year for which the revocation is to apply.80
5. Unwanted Partnershio
When a natural resource co-ownership fails to make the election pre-
scribed by section 761, a partnership is deemed to be created by contribu-
tion of undivided interests in property, and may be termed an "unwanted
partnership." Under such circumstances, section 704(c)(3) provides that
depreciation, depletion, and gain or loss with respect to such properties
"shall be determined as though such undivided interests had not been con-
tributed to the partnership." 8' Under the regulations, the word "deter-
mined" is assumed to mean "allocated." 82  Items of depreciation,
depletion, and gain or loss attributable to undivided interests are, there-
fore, computed at the partnership level and allocated to the partners. 83 The
word "determined" might more logically be interpreted as "computed,"
with the result that depreciation, depletion, and gain or loss relating to
each undivided interest would be determined using the individual owner's
accounting methods. This approach recognizes that property may be used
by a partnership as part of its business operations, but not be treated as
partnership property.84 This approach has not, however, been adopted by
the Service.
III. ASSOCIATIONS, TRUSTS, AND PARTNERSHIPS
The classification of an organization as an association taxable as a cor-
poration is frequently an unwanted result. If an organization is classified
as an association, the participants in the venture will not be able to use any
of the entity-level tax deductions otherwise available if the organization
were classified as a partnership.85 An association is a separate taxable en-
tity, independent of its members, whereas a partnership or trust generally
acts as a conduit whereby items of income and loss flow through to the
partners or beneficiaries. 86
The Code defines the term "corporation" to include associations, joint
stock companies, and insurance companies, in addition to those entities
commonly known as corporations. 87 The regulations state that an organi-
zation is an association taxable as a corporation if it more closely resem-
would simply forego the making of an election to be excluded from the provisions of sub-
chapter K. See 6 J. MERTENS, supra note 21, § 35.03.
80. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(b)(3)(i).
81. I.R.C. § 704(c)(3) (1976).
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(c).
83. Id § 1.704-1(c)(3)(i).
84. The theory of recognizing the separateness of partner and partnership is given statu-
tory recognition by I.R.C. § 707 (1976), wherein certain transactions between a partner, not
acting in his capacity as a partner, and the partnership are treated as if the partner was not a
member of the organization.
85. Id § 703 (Supp. V 1981) and the regulations thereunder permit organizations quali-
fying as a partnership to make elections not accorded other entities.
86. See supra notes 3-15 and accompanying text.
87. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1976).
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bles a corporation than a partnership or trust.88 Corporate semblance is
indicated by six characteristics that are enumerated in the regulations.8 9
The first two characteristics, associates and an objective to carry on a busi-
ness and divide the gain therefrom, are common between partnerships and
corporations and are therefore not important in distinguishing between the
two forms of business entities.9° The last four characteristics, continuity of
life, centralization of management, limited liability, and free transferabil-
ity of interest, are not common between the two types of organizations
and, accordingly, are the distinguishing factors. Generally, an organiza-
tion is deemed to be an association if it possesses both of the common
characteristics and more than two of the distinguishing characteristics. 9'
Although the regulations state that other factors may be considered,
92 most
classification cases have considered only the above factors.
A. Judicial and Administrative Background-Morrissey and the Ensuing
Treasury Regulations
To determine the classification of a tax entity, principles established in
prior case law must be reviewed, particularly the landmark decision in
Morrissey v. Commissioner.93 The Morrissey decision is significant for two
reasons. First, the basic concepts developed in that case by the Supreme
Court for classifying entities are very much in use today.94 Further, the
decision synthesized what, up to the time of the decision, were a number of
confusing and apparently irreconcilable court decisions. 95
In Morrissey a trust was established by a group of real estate promoters
who conveyed land to the trustees, accompanied by exclusive power to
purchase additional properties and develop the trust holdings. The trust-
ees subdivided a portion of the land and sold lots on an installment basis.
On the remaining acreage they constructed a golf course and club house.
Beneficial interests were established in the trust, consisting of 2000 trans-
ferable preferred shares and 2000 transferable common shares. Sole man-
agement of the trust resided in the trustees, the shareholders being
permitted to vote on certain matters in an advisory capacity. Holders of
88. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1).
89. Id
90. Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(3).
91. Id § 301.7701-2(a)(2).
92. Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(1).
93. 296 U.S. 344 (1935). For an in-depth discussion of Morrissey and other case law
involving classification of entities for federal income tax purposes, see Klein, Split Personal-
ity Problems." Partnership or Association?, 24 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 453, 457-66 (1976); McGee,
Problems of the Unintentional Corporation: The Association Taxable as a Corporation, 29
INST. ON FED. TAx'N 853, 856-67 (1971); Sexton & Osteen, Class ftcation as a Partnership or
as an Association Taxable as a Corporation, 24 TULANE TAX INST. 95, 101-22 (1975).
94. See, e.g., Zuckman v. United States, 75-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9778 (Ct. Cl. 1975);
Elm St. Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 803 (1981).
95. One pre-Morrissey court described the distinction between an association and a
pure trust as "seemingly in a hopeless state of confusion." Coleman-Gilbert Assocs. v. Com-
missioner, 76 F.2d 191, 193 (lst Cir.), rev'd, 296 U.S. 369 (1935) (reversal based on criteria
established in Morrissey on same day).
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shares were not liable for acts of the trustees, and the life of the trust was to
continue unaffected by the death of any trustee or beneficiary.
The Supreme Court reviewed prior case law and determined that the
standards used in determining the classification issue had not been defini-
tively stated.96 In the early trust versus association cases, for example, one
court employed a single standard for determining proper classification.97
The Court accepted the opportunity to deliver a comprehensive explana-
tion of all the relevant factors. First, the Court clearly stated that the over-
all principle is one of resemblance to the corporate form, that "[t]he
inclusion of associations with corporations implies resemblance; but it is
resemblance and not identity. ' 98 After setting forth that overriding con-
cept, the Court enumerated the specific attributes that are the benchmarks
of corporate form. These attributes were divided into two "primary" at-
tributes and five "salient" attributes. The absence of either of the primary
attributes precludes an organization from being an association, whereas
the presence of these attributes requires additional review of the salient
attributes to determine whether there is a preponderance of corporate
characteristics.99
The primary attributes consist of associates and a common business ob-
jective. The Court determined that the word "association" implies associ-
ates and the entering into a joint enterprise for the transaction of
business. 100 A trust is distinguishable from such an enterprise since benefi-
ciaries of a trust do not ordinarily "plan a common effort or enter into a
combination for the conduct of a business enterprise."°10 After identifying
the primary attributes the Court focused on the other salient features that
the corporate form possesses. In addition to holding title to property as an
entity a corporate organization furnishes centralized management through
representatives of the members of the corporation. A corporate enterprise
is secure from termination or interruption by the death of the owner of
beneficial interests and thus the transfer of beneficial interests does not
affect the continuity of the enterprise. Finally, a corporation permits lim-
ited personal liability for participants in the organization in the amount of
the participants' investment. 102 The Morrissey Court compared the corpo-
rate attributes to the characteristics of a trust and noted the striking simi-
96. 296 U.S. at 356.
97. The standard used by the court was the degree of control exercised by the benefi-
ciaries over the management of the trust. See Crocker v. Malley, 249 U.S. 223, 232-34
(1919). This view was followed in early regulations, Treas. Reg. 45, 62, art. 1504 (1921), but
was overturned by the Supreme Court in Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 155 (1924). The
Court in that case decided that beneficiary control was not of special significance for associa-
tion status, but did not elucidate which factors were relevant. Treas. Reg. 65, art. 1504
(1924), T.D. 3748, IV-2 C.B. 7 (1925), followed the reasoning of Hecht that the extent or lack
of control exercised by the beneficiaries was not in itself determinative of the tax status of a
trust.
98. 296 U.S. at 357.
99. Id. at 359.
100. Id at 360.
101. Id. at 357.
102. Id at 362.
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larities.'0 3 Subsequent judicial and administrative decisions rely almost
exclusively on Morrissey's comparison technique and on the concepts de-
veloped in the case to settle questions of classification. The most notable
example is the definition in the current Treasury Regulations of "associa-
tions," which almost mirrors the Morrissey decision."14 A general review
of all corporate characteristics follows since a thorough understanding of
each is important in analyzing a classification issue, whether the intended




In order to create an association, two or more persons must take part in
a joint undertaking.10 5 "Person" is used in a sense that includes individu-
als, corporations, partnerships, trusts, and other entities.1°6 If only one
person is involved, or if several are involved but there is no joint action, no
association will be found. The Tax Court confirmed the requirement that
more than one person be engaged in the undertaking when it held that a
sole proprietorship, not an association, existed where the sole owner of a
corporation carried on the business after revocation of the corporate char-
ter.' 0 7 Although the operation of a business after expiration of a corporate
charter ordinarily creates an association taxable as a corporation,10 8 the
Tax Court held that the general rule was not applicable where there were
no associates. "09
The same principle was illustrated in A.A. Lewis & Co. v. Commis-
sioner, °10 in which the grantor of a trust assigned a tract of land to a
trustee who was empowered to collect and distribute to the grantor the
funds received from disposition of portions of the land handled by an ex-
clusive agent. The trustee paid the prearranged commission to the agent
and the remainder of the proceeds to the grantor. The Court in Lewis held
that (1) there were no associates, (2) the relationship between the parties
was one of agency, and (3) there was therefore no association taxable as a
corporation.II' Even though two or more persons were involved, the com-
bination must be voluntary and with the intent of conducting a joint effort
103. Id at 363.
104. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2.
105. Id § 301.7701-2(a)(2); see A.A. Lewis & Co. v. Commissioner, 301 U.S. 385, 388
(1937).
106. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1) (1976).
107. Knoxville Truck Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 616, 622 (1948); see
also Coast Carton Co. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 894, 905 (1948) (corporation held to be an
individually owned and operated business and not an association taxable as a corporation).
108. See Crocker v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 64, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1936); Burleson v. Com-
missioner, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 932, 936-37 (1953). This view was codified in prior regulations.
Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.3797-2 (1940).
109. Knoxville Truck Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 616, 622 (1948).
110. 301 U.S. 335 (1937).
111. Id at 389.
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in order to constitute an association taxable as a corporation. This princi-
ple has been applied in a number of situations involving trusts. In one
case, the court held that in an ordinary trust the beneficiaries are in no real
sense associated in the conduct of the trust affairs. The trust does not
become an association simply because there are two or more benefi-
ciaries.11 2 In that case the court observed that the associates test is not
ordinarily met merely because of the existence of a trust, but that the char-
acteristics of the trust may fulfill the test of resemblance to a corpora-
tion. 3  The Supreme Court advanced a similar test in Morrissey,"14
stating that the beneficiaries of a trust "do not ordinarily. . . plan a com-
mon effort or enter into a combination for the conduct of a business enter-
prise."' 15 In both of these cases, however, the courts held that the
organizations were associations taxable as corporations, in part because
such a voluntary common effort did exist. 16
In another case where a trust was not formed or continued by voluntary
action of the beneficiaries, the court stated that no conclusive evidence in-
dicated that the organization was a business venture or that the trustee had
engaged in business.1 7 Accordingly, the court held that the trust was not
taxable as a corporation." 8 The court stated that the presence of salient
corporate attributes is some evidence, but not a conclusive test, of an asso-
ciation taxable as a corporation, since an association implies associates and
doing business. 19 The trust in question was substantial in amount, with
property consisting of corporate stocks, bonds, notes, bank deposits, and
loans to several companies. The trust property was held by the trustee for
the benefit of four children who held transferable shares or trust certifi-
cates that were in fact never transferred. The purpose of the trust was to
convert the trust property and make distributions to the beneficiaries. The
court held that association status implies entering into a joint enterprise
and that no joint enterprise existed in this case since the trust was not
formed by voluntary act of the beneficiaries. 120 Conversely, where the
grantors of the trust are also the beneficiaries, and the trust is simply a
means of pooling common interests to conduct a joint business enterprise
for profit, the trust is merely a mechanism used by the associate-benefi-
112. Kilgallon v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 337, 340 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 622
(1938); see Estate of Becker v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 341, 346 (1943).
113. Kilgallon v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 337, 340 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 622
(1938).
114. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
115. Id at 357.
116. Id at 360; Kilgallon v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 337, 340 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 305
U.S. 622 (1938).
117. United States v. Davidson, 115 F.2d 799, 801 (6th Cir. 1940). Voluntary action
could not have occurred since two of the beneficiaries did not know of the trust for six
months. Id
118. Id. at 802.
119. Id at 801. In Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), the Court stated the
reverse side of this rule: "While the use of corporate forms may furnish persuasive evidence
of 'he existence of an association, the absence of particular forms. . . cannot be regarded as
decisive." Id at 358.
120. United States v. Davidson, 115 F.2d 799, 801 (6th Cir. 1940).
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ciaries to operate a business venture. Under such circumstances, the trust
is an association taxable as a corporation. 21
2 Business Conductedfor Profit
Even if two or more persons have associated themselves in a joint effort
and in a form that bears a substantial resemblance to a corporation, the
organization is not an association taxable as a corporation unless the joint
effort amounts to the conduct of a business for profit.' 22 The phrase "con-
duct of a business for profit" contains two distinct concepts: initially there
must be an active conduct of a business and, further, a profit motive must
exist with respect to the business conducted.
Profits may be derived from investments, such as royalty interest, that
require no particular management decisions. This is the case where the
trustee's primary responsibility is to collect income and distribute the pro-
ceeds net of expenses. A distinction should be drawn between those trusts
formed for investment purposes based upon the powers conferred upon the
trustee by the trust agreement and other trusts. If the trustee has power
under the trust agreement to vary the investment of the beneficiaries, the
trust will be considered an association. Conversely, if the trust is a fixed
investment trust wherein no such powers exist, it will be treated as a pure
trust.123 Competent tax planning requires notice of the fact that the mere
presence of such powers has been held sufficient to cause the trust to be
treated as an association.' 24
In the oil and gas industry there is revived interest in the use of royalty
trusts. Typically, the trusts are created as a means of financing or for the
purpose of effecting distributions to shareholders. 25 Recent examples of
such trusts include those created by Houston Oil and Minerals, Mesa Pe-
troleum Co., and Southland Royalty Co. 26 The classification issue for
these trusts tends to turn on whether conduct of business for a profit is
present.127 Due to a myriad of related tax consequences involving the cre-
121. Kilgallon v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 337, 339 (7th Cir. 1938); Leszczynski v. Com-
missioner, 29 B.T.A. 551, 557 (1933).
122. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2); see Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 356
(1935).
123. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c); see Commissioner v. North Am. Bond Trust, 122 F.2d
545 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 701 (1942).
124. Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Assocs., 296 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1935); Hoersting Fam-
ily Trust v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 810, 812 (1945).
125. Liquidating trusts, which are not subject to treatment as associations taxable as cor-
porations, are defined as trusts "formed with the objective of liquidating particular assets
and not as an organization having as its purpose the carrying on of a profit-making busi-
ness." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(d). A liquidating trust may become a taxable association,
however, by unduly prolonging the liquidation or by obscuring the liquidating purpose with
business activities. Id Liquidating trusts are frequently formed to receive assets that are
difficult to sell within the 12-month liquidating period specified in I.R.C. § 337 (West 1978 &
Supp. 1983).
126. See Pearl, Too Clever by Hap, FORBES, July 6, 1981, at 43.
127. In Porter Property Trustees, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 681 (1940), the Board
stated that even a strict trust may be an association taxable as a corporation "if it is at the
same time conducted for profit." Id at 690; see Hoersting Family Trust v. Commissioner, 4
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ation of these trusts, the Service initially stated that it would not issue ad-
vance rulings on "[w]hether a trust which is beneficially owned by the
shareholders of the settlor corporation is a trust for federal income tax
purposes if the corporation ...retains working interests in oil, gas, or
mineral properties, the royalty interests of which properties are transferred
to the trust.' 28 Recently, however, the Service announced that it will is-
sue rulings in this area.' 29
A private letter ruling issued before the initial ban on advance rulings
considered the tax consequences of such organizations.' 30 The ruling in-
volved a corporation and one of its subsidiaries that formed a partnership
to which certain overriding royalty interests were transferred. A separate
trust was created for the purpose of selling beneficial interest certificates to
the public and using the proceeds of the offering to acquire a ninety-nine
percent interest in the partnership. The service held that the entity consti-
tuted a fixed investment trust taxable as a trust since the trustee possessed
no power to alter the investment of the certificate holders. The ruling
noted that the trust could make temporary investments of the income prior
to the time distributions were made to certificate holders. These tempo-
rary investments prior to distribution, however, did not constitute the car-
rying on of a trade or business.131
Although the conduct of business without a profit objective is relatively
rare, examples may be found in organizations that are formed to furnish
services or supply products to members of the organization. In one such
case under the 1939 Code three corporations bought and operated a power
plant exclusively for their mutual benefit through a committee composed
of one representative from each corporation. The joint operation was held
not to be an association taxable as a corporation because the court empha-
sized that profit was not the objective of the cooperative arrangement. 32
Subsequently the Tax Court rejected this conclusion in Madison Gas &
Electric Co. v. Commissioner. 133 In a similar factual situation the partner-
ship agreement contained a take-in-kind provision. The court determined
that the joint profit motive was present with the in-kind distribution of
electricity from the power plant, and that the organization should, there-
fore, be classified as a partnership.' 34
T.C.M. (CCH) 810 (1945); National Bank of Commerce v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 119
(1936).
128. Rev. Proc. 82-22, 1982-1 C.B. 469.
129. Rev. Proc. 83-11, 1983-8 I.R.B. 14.
130. Ltr. Rul. 8113068 (Dec. 31, 1980); see also Ltr. Rul. 8223015 (trust created to effect
distribution to shareholders treated as trust).
131. See Commissioner v. North Am. Bond Trust, 122 F.2d 545, 546 (2d Cir. 1941); Rev.
Rul. 75-192, 1975-1 C.B. 384.
132. Cooperative Power Plant v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 1143, 1149 (1940); see also
Cooperative Ins. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 1151 (1940) (cooperative service joint agency
formed by three corporations to administer workmen's compensation claims held not associ-
ation taxable as corporation).
133. 72 T.C. 521 (1979).




The Treasury Regulations state that centralized management exists if
any person or group of persons not constituting all the members of the
organization has continuing exclusive authority to make management de-
cisions in order to conduct the affairs of the organization.' 35 This quality
is, however, characteristic of most business enterprises. In limited partner-
ships, for example, the general partners are the parties vested with man-
agement of the enterprise. In such cases centralized management exists if
substantially all the partnership interests are held by limited partners. 36 If
the general partners own substantial interests in the partnership, however,
centralized management is lacking. Based on the holding of substantial
ownership interests, the general partners presumably make decisions
largely for their own benefit rather than for the other members. Hence, the
general partners are not deemed to be acting in a representative capac-
ity.' 37 The Service will rule that centralized management is not present if
the general partners own twenty percent or more of the capital or profits of
the partnership. 38 In addition to the ownership requirements, the right of
the limited partners to remove the general partner may cause the organiza-
tion to possess centralized management. 139 The determination is primarily
one of fact. If the limited partner's right to removal is substantially re-
stricted, as in the event of theft or embezzlement, then the partnership will
not necessarily possess centralized management.14  Apparently the right
of removal must be exercised by most of the limited partners and must not
be restricted in order for centralized management to exist. In a general
partnership all of the partners have the right to incur obligations on behalf
of the partnership insofar as the relation of the partnership to outsiders
may be concerned,' 4' even though the partners between themselves may
have agreed that such authority is vested only in a managing partner or
group of partners. As a consequence, a general partnership is not deemed
to have centralization of management.142
partnership have the right to take oil and gas in kind. Bentex Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 20
T.C. 565, 571 (1953).
135. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1).
136. Id § 301.7701-2(c)(4).
137. Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 738-39 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Larson v. Commis-
sioner, 66 T.C. 159, 177 (1976).
138. See 1 W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, supra note 2, § 3.0614][b], at 3-50
(1977).
139. The Service recently amended the regulations to deal with such situations. See
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4).
140. In Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), the general partner's interest in the
partnership terminated on dismissal of the general partner by the limited partners, such that
the general partner was held not to have the independent proprietary interest of a typical
general partner. Id at 177-79. Additionally, the finding of centralized management was
supported by the fact that the limited partners held substantially all the interests in the
partnership. Id at 177, 179.
141. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. 132 (1969).
142. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4); see Rev. Rul. 75-19, 1975-1 C.B. 382.
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4. Continuity of Life
The common corporate characteristic of continuity of life exists if the
death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any
member will not cause a dissolution of the organization.' 43 Dissolution
means the alteration of the relationships among the members of an organi-
zation by application of local law. l'" A corporation is not affected by the
death or incapacitation of its members. A corporate shareholder may
withdraw his investment in a corporation only by finding a buyer for his
shares or upon liquidation, whereas, barring an agreement to the contrary,
a partner has the ability to withdraw from continued participation in the
venture, thus causing the partnership to terminate. 45 Hence, continuity of
life means that (1) a member, once in the organization, is limited in the
means by which he may withdraw, and (2) the organization itself continues
in spite of changes in the identity or character of its members.
Frequently, members of a partnership suffer a substantial detriment if
the venture does not continue to the specified transaction date or at least
until all of the partners have fulfilled their obligations under the agree-
ment. To so provide in the partnership agreement runs afoul of the con-
tinuity test whether, theoretically, the specified term was one day, a year,
or several years.'4 The agreement may, however, provide that the part-
nership continue for a specified term, abrogate the usual termination be-
cause of withdrawal, and provide a substantial economic penalty upon any
partner, general or limited, who decides to withdraw at an earlier date. So
long as each partner has a right to withdraw, even though such right is
subject to penalty, the entity apparently lacks continuity, but this conclu-
sion may be subject to question by the Service.
As previously noted, the term "dissolution" means a change in the rela-
tionship among the members of an organization by operation of local law.
Members of a partnership frequently provide in the agreement that the
remaining partners may continue the business despite the death, bank-
ruptcy, or withdrawal of any partner. For example, assume the remaining
partners may reform the partnership within thirty days after dissolution.
In this situation the partnership does not necessarily possess continuity of
life. 147 If the death, bankruptcy, or withdrawal of a partner causes a disso-
lution by operation of local law in spite of the terms of the agreement, then
143. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1).
144. Id § 301.7701-2(b)(2).
145. Because of this right to terminate the partnership, "a general partnership subject to
a statute corresponding to the Uniform Partnership Act and a limited partnership subject to
a statute corresponding to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act both lack continuity of
life." Id § 301.7701-2(b)(3).
146. Id. § 301.7701-2(b)(2).
147. In Glensder Textile Co. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942), the general partners
reserved the right to continue the business on the death, incapacity, or retirement of a gen-
eral partner. The Board held that this form of "contingent continuity," whereby the remain-
ing general partners must agree to continue the business of the partnership, did not fulfill the
corporate characteristic of continuity of life. Id at 185-86.
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continuity of life is lacking.' 48 The practical effect of the agreement in
these circumstances is to cause a dissolution of the partnership followed by
formation of a new partnership by the remaining partners.1 49
5. Transferability of Interest
Provided a buyer can be found, corporate shareholders are usually free
to dispose of their interests or shares in the corporation. Partners, how-
ever, must usually obtain the consent of the other partners before transfer-
ring their interests since partners reserve the right to select their business
associates.150 Thus, transferability of interests, a corporate characteristic,
exists if the members owning substantially all the interests may transfer
such interests to a third party without the consent of the other members.' 5 '
Both general and limited partners must, unless the agreement provides
otherwise, obtain consent of all the partners before transferring their inter-
ests in the organization.' 52 The Service generally holds that the transfera-
bility of interest attribute is not present if a limited partner must obtain the
consent of the general partner or partners to transfer his partnership inter-
est and have the transferee considered a substituted partner under local
law. The attribute is also lacking if a transfer of a partnership interest
effects a dissolution, under local law, of the old organization and a forma-
tion of a new organization. 53
Of interest in this area are the myriad of new publicly traded partner-
ships such as Apache Petroleum Co., May Energy Partners, and others. In
these arrangements the limited partnership interests are freely tradable on
exchanges or over the counter markets. ' 54 At one time free transferability
of partnership interests alone was presumed to cause the Service to attack
the entity as an association. Currently, however, the Service may rule fa-
vorably as to the partnership status of these tradable entities. 55
6. Limited Liability
Limited liability exists if, under local law, no member is personally lia-
ble for the debts of the organization.' 56 General partnerships subject to
the Uniform Partnership Act do not possess this attribute since personal
liability exists with respect to each general partner. 57 Limited partner-
ships do not have limited liability because the general partner is responsi-
148. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2).
149. See Rev. Proc. 83-50, 1983-27 I.R.B. 142. The Service will not rule whether con-
tinuity of life exists if, upon removal of a general partner, less than a majority vote in inter-
est of the limited partners may elect a new one. Id.
150. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(g), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969).
151. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1).
152. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(g), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969); UNIF. LIMITED PART-
NERSHIP ACT § 19(4), 6 U.L.A. 603 (1969).
153. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1).
154. See Mack, Disincorporaing America, FORBES, Aug. 1, 1983, at 76.
155. Ltr. Rul. 8241100 (July 19, 1982).
156. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1).
157. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1969).
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ble for partnership debts.' 58 If, however, the general partner does not have
substantial assets other than its partnership interest and is, in effect, a
dummy, limited liability exists. A general partner is a dummy if it acts as
the agent of the limited partners.1 5 9 In one Tax Court case the general
partner was not considered a dummy, even though subject to removal by
the limited partners, because the court found that the general partner was
very active in the business and did not merely carry out the limited part-
ner's wishes. 160 Further, the right of removal gave the limited partners
control only over their investment, not control of operations. 161 What con-
stitutes substantial assets for an individual general partner is not clear.
Substantial assets apparently exist if the general partner's assets are large
in comparison to the assets of individuals, even though insufficient to cover
the partnership's liabilities. If the general partner or partners' assets are
insignificant, however, the limited partners have effectively insulated
themselves from liability and the corporate attribute of limited liability is
present. The Service has provided, at least for ruling purposes, a more
objective test for determining whether a corporate general partner of a lim-
ited partnership has substantial assets.' 62
C Special Problems Relating to Limited Partnerships and Limited
Liability Companies
1 Corporate Characteristics and Limited Partnershps-The Larson Case
Limited partnerships rather than general partnerships have been a fre-
quent object of scrutiny in determining classification for taxation purposes.
Larson v. Commissioner 163 provides an excellent example of the scrutiny a
limited partnership may undergo in the resolution of the classification is-
sue. The initial opinion by the Tax Court in that case was favorable to the
government in classifying the limited partnership as an association. 164 The
decision caused considerable concern in the tax community due to fears
that most limited partnerships would thereafter be considered associations.
The full Tax Court subsequently reconsidered the case and held in favor of
the taxpayer.165 In Larson two limited partnerships were formed. One
acquired an apartment complex and the other acquired an orchard with
future development potential. Because the two partnerships were similar
in structure, the court considered them together. 166 Upon review of prior
case law, the full Tax Court noted the continuing significance of the basic
158. Generally speaking, a general partner in a limited partnership is subject to the same
restrictions and liabilities as a general partner in a general partnership. UNIF. LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. 586 (1969).
159. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2).
160. Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 181 (1976).
161. Id
162. See infra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
163. 66 T.C. 159 (1976).
164. 65 T.C. No. 10 (1975) (opinion withdrawn on Nov. 7, 1975). This opinion was
favorable since an association is taxable as a corporation.
165. 66 T.C. 159 (1976).
166. The same corporation served as the general partner in both limited partnerships.
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concept enunciated in Morrissey167 that "[a]n organization will be taxed as
a corporation if, taking all relevant characteristics into account, it more
nearly resembles a corporation than some other entity." 168 The court fur-
ther observed that the apparent intent of the applicable regulations was to
give each major corporate characteristic equal weight in the final classifica-
tion of the entity.' 69
The court reviewed each corporate attribute in detail before determining
that the limited partnerships were taxable as such. Continuity of life was
lacking because the bankruptcy of the general partner would cause disso-
lution. The fact that a 100% vote of the limited partners could result in the
appointment of a new general partner did not change the conclusion. Re-
lying on Glensder Textile Co. v. Commissioner,170 the court determined that
contingent continuity of life is not a corporate characteristic.171 Central-
ized management was present in each partnership since the general partner
did not have a substantial proprietary interest 172 and could be removed by
vote of the limited partners, similar to the director of a corporation.
1 73
The court also found the attribute of free transferability of interests. Al-
though the partnership agreement placed some restrictions on transfer,
they did not apply to transfers for fair market value. 174 Finally, the orga-
nizations lacked limited liability since the general partner was not a
dummy of the limited partners but rather took an active part in manage-
ment of the venture. 75 Since the limited partnerships did not exhibit a
preponderance of corporate characteristics and since each characteristic is
to be given equal weight, the partnerships were treated as such. 176 The
court stated that its decision was based on the framework provided by the
regulations. 177 The court also indicated that the Service should attack the
limited partnership form by legislative or additional administrative action,
not by attempting to diminish the importance or alter the construction of
the existing regulations.17 8
2 Ruling Policies-Limited Partnerships
Since limited partnerships are a popular form of investment, the rele-
167. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 354-55 (1935).
168. 66 T.C. at 172; see Bush #1 v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 218, 227-28 (1967).
169. 66 T.C. at 172.
170. 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942).
171. 66 T.C. at 174-75.
172. Id. at 177-79.
173. Id. at 178.
174. Id at 183. The general partner's approval was required before a limited partner
could transfer his or her interest, but such approval could not unreasonably be withheld.
The limited partners' interests were nonetheless held to be freely transferable.
175. Id at 181. The Commissioner argued in Larson that limited liability existed if the
general partner lacked substantial assets or was acting merely as a dummy for the limited
artners, contrary to the conjunctive language of the regulations. See Treas. Reg.
301.7701-2(d)(2). The court held that both conditions of the regulation must be satisfied.
66 T.C. at 180.
176. Id at 185.
177. Id. at 185-86.
178. See id.
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vant characteristics and ruling policies that will affect the classification of
such an entity deserve examination. For many years, the general partner
of a limited partnership was typically a corporation possessing few or no
assets in order to avoid liability to the promoters of the partnership. The
theory was that at least two of the other three corporate attributes (i.e.,
centralized management, continuity of enterprise, and transferability of in-
terest) could be avoided, and therefore, the partnership status of the lim-
ited partnership would not be affected even if the corporate attribute of
limited liability were present. To avoid this result, the Service as a matter
of ruling policy requires that a sole corporate general partner of a limited
partnership have, exclusive of its partnership interest, assets that are "sub-
stantial" in relation to the capital contributions of the limited partners. 179
This policy finds support in a Board of Tax Appeals decision that stated
"[ilf, for instance, the general partners were not men with substantial assets
risked in the business, but were mere dummies without real means acting
as the agents of the limited partners, whose investments made possible the
business, there would be something approaching the corporate form of
stockholders and directors."1 80
In 1972 the Service formalized its ruling policy relating to limited part-
nerships having a sole corporate general partner and announced that it
would issue rulings concerning the partnership status of such a limited
partnership only if the sole corporate general partner had a net worth at all
times during the life of the partnership as follows:
If the corporate general partner has an interest in only one limited
partnership and total [capital] contributions to the partnership are less
than $2,500,000, the net worth of the corporate general partner at all
times will be at least 15 percent of such total contributions [to the
partnership] or $250,000, whichever is [smaller];
if [the corporate general partner has an interest in only one limited
partnership and] the total [capital] contributions to the partnership are
$2,500,000 or more, the net worth of the corporate general partner at
all times will be at least 10 percent of such total contributions.1 8 1
In computing net worth under both requirements, the fair market value
of the corporate general partner's assets is used.' 82 In making the net
worth calculation, the value of the corporate general partner's interests in
the limited partnership, presumably whether as a general partner or as a
limited partner, and accounts and notes receivable from and payable to the
limited partnership are excluded.' 83 If the corporate general partner holds
interests in more than one limited partnership, both net worth require-
ments are applied separately for each limited partnership and the corpo-
rate general partner must have a net worth at least as great as the sum of
179. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735. The regulation requires that the general partner
have substantial assets, without providing a reference point from which to measure the ade-
quacy of such assets. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2).
180. Glensder Textile Co. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 176, 183 (1942).





the amounts required under either requirement for each separate limited
partnership.184
In addition, the 1972 pronouncement of ruling policy requires that
(1) the limited partners cannot own, directly or indirectly (as determined
under section 318), more than 20 percent of the stock of the corporate gen-
eral partner or any of its affiliates, as determined under section 1504,
(2) the purchase of a limited partnership interest cannot entail an option or
a requirement to purchase any type of security in the corporate general
partner, and (3) the limited partnership must be organized and operated in
accordance with applicable local law.' 85 The Service applies these guide-
lines rather strictly. Private rulings indicate that the partnership status of
the particular limited partnership is dependent on continued compliance
with the guidelines. 186 The implication is, therefore, that if the partnership
fails to satisfy the above ruling requirements, regardless of the absence of
two or more of the other corporate attributes such as centralized manage-
ment, continuity of enterprises, and transferability of interest, the Service
might deem the partnership to be an association. A more logical conclu-
sion would be that if the requirements are not met, the advance ruling is
invalid. The approach the Service will take in this area remains to be seen.
These requirements apply, however, only to the issuance of advance rul-
ings as to partnership status in situations where a limited partnership has a
corporation as its sole general partner. Apparently if a limited partnership
has more than one corporate general partner, the net worths of the corpo-
rations can be aggregated to meet the requirements, although the Service's
ruling policy is not clear in this area. If the limited partnership has one or
more noncorporate general partners, the ruling requirements do not seem
to apply and the only requirement is that a representation be made that the
noncorporate general partner or partners are not judgment-proof and have
substantial assets that can be reached by creditors. 87 Such a representa-
tion is generally satisfactory for advance ruling purposes.
One question that has arisen regarding the computation of net worth
under the requirements is whether the value of a subscription receivable,
account receivable, demand note receivable, or other note receivable from
an affiliate can be included as an asset. If the receivable bears interest so
that it can be readily valued and could be attached by creditors, it should
qualify as an asset for purposes of the net worth test. Determining the
proper measure of the total contributions to the partnership when partner-
ship contributions are paid in installments presents another problem. If a
limited partnership intends to have the limited partners contribute
$500,000 in each of three years, totalling $1,500,000 over the three years, it
184. Id This computation is exclusive of interest in any limited partnership, presumably
whether as general partner or as a limited partner, and accounts and notes receivable from
and payable to any limited partnership in which the.corporate general partner has any inter-
est. Id
185. Id
186. See, e.g., Ltr. Rul. 8202097 (Oct. 16, 1981).
187. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2).
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is generally understood that the Service will apply the fifteen percent re-
quirement to the total of $1,500,000, not to an amount that increases by
$500,000 each year. Additionally, if a corporate partner initially meets the
net worth requirements but subsequently its net worth falls below the re-
quired amount, the result is uncertain. The logical result would be that the
ruling is invalidated, 88 but the classification of the entity as a limited part-
nership should not be altered. Subsequent changes in fortune caused by
events outside the control of the parties should not cause reclassification.
Caution is required when confronting such a situation since the Service
has given no indication of its view of such events.
Another area of ruling policy regarding limited partnership has con-
cerned the Service since early 1973. This question involves the necessity of
the general partner or partners having an interest in the partnership profits
and losses throughout the life of the partnership. Historically, in many
limited partnerships and natural resources limited partnerships it has been
customary and allowable under section 704 to allocate all losses to the lim-
ited partners at least to the extent they provide the cash that creates such
losses. Further, in some cases limited partners receive all of the income
until they recover their original investment. Thereafter the general partner
or partners share profits with the limited partners. The Service apparently
finds such allocations in limited partnerships objectionable regardless of
section 704. As a result of its concern, the Service issued a Revenue Proce-
dure in 1974 that states that rulings will not ordinarily be issued unless the
aggregate partnership interests of all general partners in each material item
of partnership income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit are equal to at least
one percent of each of such items at all times during the life of the partner-
ship. 89 Any interest owned by the general partners as limited partners is
ignored in computing the one percent interest. This ruling policy, as indi-
cated above, seems to preclude a special allocation under section 704 of all
IDC to limited partners providing the cash for such costs. Under the Serv-
ice's policy, either one percent of such costs must be allocated to the gen-
eral partners, which would seem to violate the substantial economic effect
requirement of section 704190 if the general partners do not bear any eco-
nomic burden for such costs, or the general partners must provide one per-
cent of the cash for such costs. Whether such ruling policy can override
seemingly permissible allocations under section 704 will presumably be
decided by litigation.
The 1974 Revenue Procedure also requires certain additional represen-
tations for advance ruling purposes to the effect that aggregate deductions
claimed by the partners during the first two years will not exceed the
amount of equity capital invested in the limited partnership and any credi-
tor making a nonrecourse loan to the partnership may not receive an inter-
188. See Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735; Ltr. Rul. 8202097 (Oct. 16, 1981).
189. Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1074-1 C.B. 438.
190. See I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
l(b)(2), 48 Fed. Reg. 9873 (Mar. 9, 1983).
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est in the profits, capital, or property of the limited partnership in a
capacity other than as a creditor. 19' Both of these representations cause
difficulties for limited partnerships involved in natural resources explora-
tion and development. If a natural resource limited partnership is success-
ful early in its life and can arrange a nonrecourse loan for development
purposes, it may be required to defer such development until after the end
of its second year of existence if the nonrecourse loan will create deduc-
tions in excess of its equity capital, thereby causing possible interruption of
normal business activities. If a nonrecourse lender requires an option on
production as a condition to the loan, the Service may allege that such
option constitutes an interest in partnership property that violates the rep-
resentations mandated by the 1974 Revenue Procedure. 9 2
3. The Limited Liability Company
More recently, a classification problem has arisen out of the creation of
the limited liability company. The first such company was created in 1977
when the State of Wyoming enacted a statute creating the Wyoming lim-
ited liability company. 193 The organization is a hybrid between a corpora-
tion and a limited partnership, similar in form to the Spanish law limitada.
The limited liability company provides, for federal income tax purposes,
the conduit aspect of a partnership as well as limited liability to its mem-
bers. The administrative problems of some of the more exotic entities,
such as the Spanish law limitada, are avoided. 194
The classification issue with respect to the limited liability company has
caused the Service a great deal of consternation. Initially, in a private
letter ruling the Service concluded that the organization should be treated
as a partnership for federal income tax purposes. 195 Almost concurrently
with the issuance of the ruling, however, the Service issued proposed
amendments to the regulations that stated that an organization will be
treated as an association if under local law no member is personally liable
191. Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 C.B. 438, 439, provides:
[1.] The aggregate deductions to be claimed by the partners as their dis-
tributive shares of partnership losses for the first two years of operation of the
limited partnership will not exceed the amount of equity capital invested in
the limited partnership.
[2.] A creditor who makes a nonrecourse loan to a limited partnership
must not have or acquire, at any time as a result of making the loan, any direct
or indirect interest in the profits, capital, or property of the limited partnership
other than as a secured creditor.
192. In 1975 the Service issued Rev. Proc. 75-16, 1975-1 C.B. 676, relating to the issuance
of private rulings for limited partnerships. This Revenue Procedure provides a checklist for
advanced rulings for both general and limited partnerships, and focuses on many of the
issues normally associated with the formation and operation of natural resources partner-
ships. Id
193. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537 (codified at
WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1977 & Supp. 1983)).
194. For a more detailed comparison of the various entities, see Burke & Sessions, The
Wyoming Limited Liability Company. An Alternative to Sub S and Limited Partnerships?, 54
J. TAX'N 232 (1981).
195. Ltr. Rul. 8106082 (Nov. 18, 1980).
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for the debts of such organization. 196 The Service later announced that the
amendments were to be withdrawn for further consideration. 97 Cur-
rently, the Service will not issue advance rulings on the classification of
limited liability companies. 198
In order to analyze the classification issue, one must review the applica-
ble statute. Under the Wyoming statute, for example, the organization
clearly possesses the attribute of limited liability. 199 Depending upon the
structure of the agreement, however, the company may or may not possess
centralized management. The Wyoming statute allows for a flexible man-
agement structure.2 0° Should the members, via the agreement, confer con-
tinuing exclusive authority to a member to act on behalf of the
organization, then centralized management will exist. If this feature is
omitted from the agreement then each member has management authority
and the attribute will be lacking.201 A limited liability company also lacks
continuity of life since the same factors that would cause dissolution of a
partnership are present in the organization.20 2 Further, transferability of
interest should be held lacking. The ownership interests are transferable,
196. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2)-(3), 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (Nov. 17, 1980).
197. I.R.-82-145 (Dec. 16, 1982), reprinted in 2 FED. TAXES (P-H) 54,704, at 54,591
(1983).
198. Rev. Proc. 83-15, 1983-11 I.R.B. 9.
199. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-113 (1977) provides:
Neither the members of a limited liability company nor the managers of a
limited liability company managed by a manager or managers are liable under
a judgment, decree or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a debt,
obligation or liability of the limited liability company.
200. Id. § 17-15-116 provides:
Management of the limited liability company shall be vested in its members
in proportion to their contribution to the capital of the limited liability com-
pany, as adjusted from time to time to properly reflect any additional contri-
butions or withdrawals by the members; however, if provision is made for it in
the articles of organization, management of the limited liability company may
be vested in a manager or managers who shall be elected by the members in
the manner prescribed by the operating agreement of the limited liability com-
pany. . . . The manager or managers shall also hold the offices and have the
responsibilities accorded to them by the members and set out in the operating
agreement of the limited liability company.
201. Id. § 17-15-117 provides:
[N]o debt shall be contracted or liability incurred by or on behalf of a limited
liability company, except by one (1) or more of its managers if management of
the limited liability company has been vested by the members in a manager or
managers or, if management of the limited liability company is retained by the
members, then by any member.
202. Id § 17-15-123(a) provides:
A limited liability company. . . shall be dissolved upon the occurrence of any
of the following events:
(i) When the period fixed for the duration of the limited liability company
shall expire;
(ii) By the unanimous written agreement of all members; or
(iii) Upon the death, retirement, resignation, expulsion, bankruptcy, disso-
lution of a member or occurrence of any other event which terminates the
continued membership of a member in the limited liability company, unless
the business of the limited liability company is continued by the consent of all
the remaining members under a right to do so stated in the articles of organi-
zation of the limited liability company.
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but without the written consent of the other members the transferee is un-
able to step into the shoes of the transferor with respect to the membership
and management rights of the transferor.20 3 Accordingly, since the organi-
zation lacks a preponderance of corporate characteristics it should be
treated as a partnership.
4. Limited Liabilit)-The Only Relevant Factor?
As illustrated by the controversy over the proper classification of the
Wyoming limited liability company, the Service has taken a very dim view
toward organizations having the characteristic of limited liability. The ap-
parent thrust of the Service's actions in proposing to amend the regulations
is to make clear that limited liability is the single most important corporate
characteristic for taxation purposes. This position is not, however, sup-
ported by well-established case law. Morrissey established the fundamen-
tal principles for determining the federal income tax classification of
organizations and provided the overriding principle that corporate resem-
blance governs classification. Resemblance is determined by comparing
the corporate attributes identified in Morrissey to the features of the organ-
ization in question. As indicated earlier, no one attribute controls to the
exclusion of the others and each attribute is weighed equally. The promi-
nence of Morrissey is evidenced by the substantial body of case law that
has followed its dictates for the past forty-eight years and the Service's
historical adherence to Morrissey. A concrete example of Morrissey's im-
portance is the current definition of "association" in the Treasury Regula-
tions, which is squarely based on the Morrissey decision. These
regulations were issued over twenty years ago. In addition, the adminis-
trative rulings have consistently followed the Morrissey decision and its
progeny. The courts have consistently held that long-standing administra-
tive rulings should not be lightly overturned and that when such interpre-
tations and rulings continue unchanged under unamended statutes, they
should be considered as having the force and effect of law. 2°4 Taxpayers
and the Service alike depend on the reliability and enforceability of the
administrative rulings, regulations, and case law in determining their
course of action. If the Service is reluctant to concede the issue of classifi-
cation because of potential tax avoidance possibilities, a means is already
203. Id § 17-15-122 provides:
The interest of all members in a limited liability company constitutes the
personal estate of the member, and may be transferred or assigned as provided
in the operating agreement. However, if all of the other members of the lim-
ited liability company other than the member proposing to dispose of his or its
interest do not approve of the proposed transfer or assignment by unanimous
written consent, the transferee of the member's interest shall have no right to
participate in the management of the business and affairs of the limited liabil-
ity company or to become a member. The transferee shall only be entitled to
receive the share of profits or other compensation by way of income and the
return of contributions, to which that member would otherwise be entitled.
204. Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938); Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S.
167, 173-74 (1936); Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580, 583 (1930).
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available to combat such problems. The at-risk provisions of section
465205 may be used to disallow deductions by any members in excess of the
amount invested in the organization.
IV. CONCLUSION
The area of entity classification for federal income tax purposes is one in
which the Service continues to express considerable interest. Because of
the well-established classification guidelines provided by the Morrissey
case, however, the Service has been generally unsuccessful at trying to
change the classification rules by regulative or administrative rulings. If
the rules, which have served all parties relatively well for many years, are
to be changed, and this author does not believe that they should, it should
be done by legislation so that both the Service and interested taxpayers can
have an opportunity to express their views.
205. I.R.C. § 465 (West 1978 & Supp. 1983).
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